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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16591

ROBERT JAMES SALMON and TOMMY
LEE BENWELL,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants were charged with unlawfully entering
a building with intent to commit theft therein, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953, as amended)
(R. 12).

On May 8, 1979, the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen

entertained a motion to dismiss charges on entrapment grounds
(R. 16, 17).

An entrapment hearing was held on May 10, 1979,

after which the defendants' motion was denied ·(R. 18).

Trial

before a jury was set for May 30, 1979 (R. 19).
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DISPOSITION IN THE LQ\·JER COURT
On May 30, 1979, the appellants were convicted as
charged before a jury in the Fourth Judicial Distri"ct Court,
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge presiding (R. 40

, 42)'

Both appellants were later sentenced to be confined to the
Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent respectfully requests that the judgment
of guilt entered against appellants be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The appellants resided in the State of California
prior to the events in question.

The two men traveled to

Utah by car following several conversations with John Bucy,
a friend of the appellants.

Mr. Bucy lived with Jamie Flower

Before the appellants arrived in Utah, Flowers was told by
John Bucy that the appellants were coming to Utah for the
purpose of robbing some Utah drugstores (R. 183, 191).
Based on this belief, Flowers notified James H. Gillespie
of the Department of Public Safety, State Liquor and Narcotic
Enforcement, that he (Flowers) had information that two men .e:
on their way from California to Utah for the purpose of
committing burglaries in the State of Utah (R. 191, 132).
This conversation by phone took place on April 10, 1979.
Mr. Gillespie thereafter assigned Floyd Hansen to cont~t
Flowers to as.certain further information (R. 133).
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Mr. Flowers had never met the appellants prior
to their arrival in Utah the morning of April 11, 1979
(R. 182).

Appellants were then without means of supporting

themselves and they stayed at Flowers' house during their
visit.

The appellants were also without transportation as

their car had broken down so they asked Flowers i f he would
drive them around on that evening and point out some of the
drugstores in the area (R. 183).
Fl:owers met with Floyd Hansen on April ll and a
listening device was attached to Flowers' person (R. 195).
That evening Flowers, Bucy, and the appellant drove around
Salt Lake City, Draper and Riverton (R. 196).

The "Fargo"

listening device was operating during this time and Hansen,
who was maintaining surveillance by vehicle, was able to
hear the conversation in the Flowers' car over the device
(R. 196-198).
The following day, April 12, appellants again
asked Flowers to drive them around.

Appellants asked Flowers

if he knew of any drugstores outside of Salt Lake City (R.193),
and if he knew of any drugstores there.
Orem and three places he knew of there.

Flowers told them about
Flowers thereafter

contacted Gillespie and Hansen to advise them that appellants
wished to travel to Orem that evening (R. 193).

The Orem

City Police were informed as to where the burglaries would most
likely occur (R. 139).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The night of April 12 and early morning
Flowers drove Bucy and the appellants to Orem.

o

f

April !J,

After appella:~

checked two pharmacies in the Orem area, appellants had
Flowers drive to the Cascade Medical Center (R. 81).

The

appellants got out of the car and entered the South end of
the building carrying what appeared to be an empty sack
(R. 82-84, 93, 94).

The appellants were seen inside the

building passing back and forth in front of a lit window
(R. 82-84).

Appellants emerged from the building approximate!

fifteen minutes later dragging a heavy bag behind them (R. Bi,
94).

The two men got back into the car which drove out of

the center's parking lot toward Orem Boulevard (R. 84),

The

appellants were thereafter arrested after the vehicle was
stopped by Parole Sargeant Terry Taylor (R. 104, 105, 107).
William Young and Jackie Murphy, detectives, Orem
City Police Department, searched the car in which appellants
had been passengers and removed from the backseat a white
pillowcase, a Kidd fire extinguisher, a phone answering syst:
~..F radio, an electric typewriter, a calculator, screwdriver:

and leather gloves (R. 85, 98).

These items were given to

Jackie Murphy, the evidence officer at the time for the Orem
City Police (R. 95).

Murphy locked up the evidence describe:

and took both articles with her to Court on May 30, 1979.
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Jamie Flowers testified at trial that he had
never suggested or insisted that appellants commit a burglary
or any other crimes (R. 187).

Floyd Hansen, a police agent,

had the opportunity to listen to conversation in the Flowers'
car through a "Fargo" listening device, and testified that
he never heard Flowers indicate that he wanted anyone to
commit a crime (R. 197).

Hansen never heard Flowers

threaten the appellants and he never heard the appellants
state that they "didn't want to do this."
Similar

(R. 198).

testimony was given by James H. Gillespie, Jr.,

field supervisor for the department of Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (R. 133, 134).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANTS ERRONEOUSLY COMPLAIN OF
THEIR CONVICTION BY APPLYING A
LEGAL STANDARD NOT IN EFFECT AT THE
TIME OF TRIAL.
Up until this Court's decision of State v. Taylor,
(Nos. 15631 and 15645, filed August 7, 1979), Utah courts
examined the defense of entrapment, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-303
(1953, as amended), by employing a subjective test.

That

test requires a showing that the idea of the crime originate
in the mind of a police officer, who then induces the
defendant to commit the crime.

The test also requires a

-5-
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determination of whether the defendant is a person predispose:
to commit this sort of a crime.
the defendant's character.

This is done by focusing on

The appellants, however, contend

that under the objective test for entrapment, their en- ·
trapment defense should have been upheld and their motion
to dismiss should have been granted.

The objective test

also requires that the plan for crime originate in the
police officer's mind, but then the focus shifts to the
police conduct.

The test then asks if the police conduct

involved a substantial risk of inducing persons to engage
in criminal conduct who ordinarily would not engage in that
sort of conduct.

A.
THE PROPER LEGAL STANDARD \'i'AS APPLIED
CORRECTLY.
At the time of the appellant's trial, the subjecti
test, still used by the majority of states, was the proper
legal standard in force and was applied correctly.
The jury found that the plan to burglarize the
cascade Medical Center did not originate in any police
officer's mind.

The appellants argue that Flowers, an

informant for the police, planned and induced the crime.
However, the testimony at trial was sufficient to allow
the jury to weigh the evidence and conclude that, indeed,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

there had been no entrapment. Floyd Hansen testified that he
never heard (through the "Fargo" listening device)

Flowers

urged the appellants to commit a crime nor did Flowers tell
them how they should do the job.

There was also testimony

that the appellants had come to Utah intending to burglarize
drugstores.

Thus, there was evidence as to the origin of

the plan for crime and the defendants' propensity to commit
crime.

In their task of weighing the evidence and the credibility

of witnesses, the jury believed this evidence and therefore
found that the appellants had not been entrapped.
Moreover, under either the subjective or the
objective test, there could be no entrapment since Flowers
was not a police agent.

In State v. Taylor, (Nos. 15631

and 15645 at p. 6 & 7, filed August 7, 1979), this Court
said, "Entrapment, as a defense, is not available to one
who is induced by a private person to commit a crime.
Since entrapment can be asserted only when one is induced
to commit a crime by a government agent, the obvious focus
of this defense is directed to the conduct of the government."
There was evidence at trial that Flowers was not a "government
agent."

Mr. Gillespie testified that Flowers did not work

for him and was not an agent of the police force

(R. 135) ·
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Appellants are asking this Court to apply the
objective test in this case, as was done in State v. Taylor

_,

0

in order to avoid the J ury's verdict.

Th e appe 11 ants were

convicted by a jury on May 30, 1979.

State v. Taylor

was decided by this Court on August 7, 1979.

What appeliants

actually seek then is retroactive application of State v.
Taylor,

(Nos. 15631 and 15645, filed August 7, 1979).

B.
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN STATE V.
TAYLOR, ANNOUNCING ADOPTION OF THE
OBJECTIVE TEST, SHOULD NOT BE
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
The criteria for retroactive application of a
new court-created rule in the area of criminal law was
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).

In that case, the court

refused to retroactively apply Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436

(1966), a decision rendered just

was heard by the Court.

~

week before

~

In determining whether to give

retrospective or prospective effect to decisions adopti~
such new rules, the Court listed these considerations:
(1)

the purpose of the rule involved;

(2) reliance placed

upon the former rule; and (3) the effect which
retroactive application of the new rule would have on the
administration of justice.

384 U.S. 727.
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First, the purpose of the new rule in determining
entrapment (the objective test), is deterrance of police
misconduct.

Under the Johnson rationale, retroactive

application is only justified if the new rule affects "the
very integrity of the fact-finding process" and averted
"the clear danger of convicting the innocent."
728.

Id. at 727,

The Court in Johnson illustrated this standard by

pointing to cases where the Court had given retroactive
effect to constitutional rules of criminal procedure such
as decisions establishing the right to counsel at trial or
a probation revocation hearing, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335

(1963), and Memoha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).

Another example of retroactive application of new rules involved
the right of an indigent to free transcript on appeal.

Griffin

v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
A new rule affecting police conduct does not
qualify as a constitutional rule of criminal procedure which
enhances "the reliability of the fact-finding process."
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 728, 729 (1966).
were not denied any procedural rights.
a heari-hg on their motion to dismiss.
that there was no valid entrapment
submitted the issue to the jury.
(5)

(1953, as amended).

Appellants

They were accorded
The court determined

defense and properly
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-303(4)

The accused had competent counsel at

trial and were afforded a jury trial.

The integrity of the

fact-finding process which resulted in their convictions was not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
threatened
by use
of the
subjective
then
Library Services
and Technology
Act, administered bytest
the Utah State
Library. in ef_fect.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Furthermore, the purpose of the new rule
(deterring police misconduct) is similar to those cases
in which retroactive application is denied.
v. Walker, 381 U.S.

In

Linkle~

618 (1965), a decision barring use of

evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure was not
applied retroactively; the purpose of the rule was to
deter the police from conducting unlawful searches.
Deist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), refused to
retroactively apply Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) , a decision which precluded the use of evidence
obtained by electronic eavesdropping.

Finally, Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a decision limiting the
police's right to interrogate defendants without the
presence of counsel, was not applied retroatively in
Johnson v. New Jersey, supra.

The Court reasoned that

deprivation of counsel during the investigative stage
does not necessarily impair the integrity of the truth£ inding process.

In all of these cases, as in the instant

case, the purpose of the new rule was to deter police
misconduct.

In all of the cases retroactive application

was denied.

Respondent submits that the Utah Supreme

Court in Taylor, supra, made clear that the focus of its ;

-10-
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decision was to prevent police misconduct and did not go
to the integrity of the fact-finding process.

For

example, at p. 13 of the green sheet opinion, this court
states:
It should be emphasized that defendant
engaged in conduct proscribed by statute
and was guilty of a crime. However, his
conviction cannot stand for the reason the
statute condemns the conduct of the state
in inducing the crime, as a perversion of
the proper standards of administration of
criminal law.
Moreover, at p. 11, this Court discusses why the objective
test was adopted over the subjective test, to-wit:
curb police misconduct.

to

Respondent therefore contends

that, for this reason alone, retroactive application of
State v. Taylor (Nos. 15631 and 15645, filed August 7, 1979),
should be denied.
Secondly, the United States Supreme Court in
Johnson, supra, also stated that the fact that retroactive
application of a decision would seriously disrupt the
administration of criminal laws was a valid consideration
in determining retroactivity.

384 U.S. at 731.

Here,

retroactive application of Taylor would require the retrial
or release of numerous prisoners--an unjustifiable burden
on the administration of justice.

-11-
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More important is the reliance law enforcement
officials placed on the subjective test applied in the
pre-Taylor decisions.

Applying Taylor

retrospectiveh

would place a different and possibly a heavier burden upon
prosecutors.
(1969).

See Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213

Before Taylor, when entrapment was asserted as a

defense, the focus was not solely on police conduct, but
also on the defendant's predisposition to commit a crime.
However, now the focus is directed to the conduct of the
government, and the prosecutor has a different evidentiary
burden because the objective test eliminates presentation
proof by evidence of the accused's er iminal character or
predisposition by evidence of past offenses.

See

~·

Taylor, supra.
In Green v. Turner, 443 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 19111
the Tenth Circuit held that the United States Supreme Court\
decision of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), did not!
apply retroactively even though Boykin was a landmark
decision which established the modicum of due process
required before a guilty plea could be accepted.

If

~

· h a ff ec t e d th e fundamental consti·
and Boykin, both o f wh ic
tutional rights of a defendant, did not qual1· f Y as the type:
of case which could be applied retrospectively,

surely~

does not justify retroactive application to defendants
similarly situated.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

In State v. Kelbach, 461 P.2d 297 (Utah 1969),
this Court refused to apply United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), retroactively because the police lineup
in which the defendants were identified occurred prior
to June 12, 1967, the date of

the~

decision.

No

further explanation of this ruling was made, thus implying,
perhaps, a strict rule that there should not be retrospective application of a decision which does not
expressly provide for such application.
In another Utah decision, the State advocated
a change in the construction of Utah Code Ann.

§

77-39-4

(1953, as amended), and also asked that the change be
retroactive so as to apply to the proceeding.
Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977).

State v.

This Court declined

and appeared to voice a general principle "of honoring
the established law.

If there is to be such a change in

the law whether by legislative act or by judicial decision,
it seems that it should have only prospective effect."
Id. at 1102.
Therefore, respondent submits that State v.
Taylor should have only prospective effect because retrospective application would impose too great a burden on
administrators and on law enforcement officials and
prosecutors who have relied on prior decisions regarding
entrapment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED
A PORTION OF APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY ON
HEARSAY GROUNDS.
The appellants cite as alternative grounds
for reversal their argument that testimony offered by
one of the appellants was improperly excluded as hearsay.
At trial a question was asked on direct
examination by the defense which referred to Flowers'
conduct in inducing appellants to commit crimes.

The

position of the defense had been that Flowers had made
statements which induced the crime, for example, that
Flowers wanted the men to burglarize a drugstore and
that they should do it in a certain manner, etc.

The

prosecutor, therefore, objected to the answer given:
"Well, for one he drove us around.

He was talking about

. , " on the ground that was hearsay since the statement
was offered to show the truth of the matter asserted
(R.153,154, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63).

Counsel

stated that the statement was offered for their truth
as the statements were at issue in determining whether
Flowers had induced the appellants to commit the burglary.
Appellants contend that the testimony was not offered
to show that the statements were true.
Respondents submit that if the statements were
·
· t ru th , th e ev1' dence would
offered for anything
but t h eir
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be irrelevant as lacking any tendency to prove the
existence of any material fact.
Evidence.

Rule 1, Utah Rules of

In other words, unless the statements were

true, they could not show that the appellants had been
entrapped.

The statements could only have been crucial

evidence going to the issue of entrapment if they had
been true--that Flowers uttered words designed to induce
or compel the appellants to burglarize the Cascade
Medical Center.

Thus, the trial court properly excluded

the evidence as inadmissible hearsay under Rule 63, Utah
Rules of Evidence.
Appellant cites State v. Kasai, 540 P.2d 949
(Utah 1975) , as the rule to be applied in determining whether
reversal is justified.

Respondent suggests that even had

there been error below, admission of the appellant's
testimony would not have resulted in a different result.
The testimony of Hansen and Gillespie was that Flowers
had not made statements which would induce the commission
of a crime (R.133,134,197,198).
testimony of Flowers himself.
opportunity to cross examine

Such was also the
The defense had the

and cross examination of

Flowers did not reveal any retraction of his testimony on
direct examination.

It was the jury's task, therefore,
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1
to weigh the evidence and credibility of the witnesses
and there is nothing which would indicate the likelihood
of a different result had the appellant's testimony not been
admitted.

Therefore, reversal is not justified in this case

because the trial court did not err in excluding hearsay and
such exclusion was not prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
Respondent, therefore, urges this Court to uphold
the guilty verdict entered against the appellants in the
court below because the legal standard in determining
entrapment was properly applied.

Furthermore, retroactive

application of State v. Taylor should not be applied for the
reason stated in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384

u. s.

719 (1966),

and because the evidence at trial shows that even under the
objective test, the jury could still find that the appellan
were not entrapped.
Finally, the judgment of guilt should not be
reversed because the trial court properly excluded testimonJ
of statements offered for the truths of the matter assertal
which is prohibited by Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of EViden
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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